Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game by İriş, D. et al.
Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102313/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
İriş, D., Lee, J. and Tavoni, A. (2019) Delegation and public pressure in a threshold






Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 




Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold 





Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), 
as they entail decision-making at nested hierarchical scales: at a lower level 
individuals elect a representative, while at a higher scale elected delegates decide 
on the provision level, with some degree of scrutiny from their constituency. 
Furthermore, many such decisions involve uncertainty about the magnitude of the 
contribution that is needed for the good to be provided (or bad to be avoided). In 
such circumstances delegates can serve as important vehicles for coordination by 
aggregating societal preferences for provision. Yet, the role of delegation in 
threshold public goods games is understudied. We contrast the behavior of 
delegates to that of self-representing individuals in the avoidance of a public bad in 
an experimental setting. We randomly assign twelve subjects into four teams and 
ask each team to elect a delegate via majority voting. The elected delegates play 
several variants of a one-shot public goods game in which losses can ensue if the 
sum of their contributions falls short of a threshold. We find that when delegation 
is coupled with a mild form of public pressure, it has a significantly negative effect 
on contributions, even though the non-delegates can only signal their preferred 
levels of public good contributions. The reason is that delegates give more weight 
to the least cooperative suggestion: they focus on the lower of the two public good 
contributions recommended by their teammates. 
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Much of human activity entails delegation, both at the inter-personal level and at 
the societal level. One reason for delegating decisions is that while we may have clear 
preferences for certain options over others, we often lack the ability or authority to 
implement such choices. In addition, given the difficulty of aggregating heterogeneous 
preferences, delegation has the potential to ease decision-making. Hence, in many 
situations, we rely on a “representative,” such as a family member or a politician, 
depending on the scale of the decision task. At the same time, we express preferences with 
varying degrees of formality; examples range from voting on political candidates or 
referendum topics in democracies to letting a member of the household choose where to 
have dinner. 
Many group decisions involving the provision of a public good rely on voluntary 
contributions, which are beneficial for the group, but costly for individuals. Here, we focus 
on the provision of a threshold public good, which is worthless unless enough has been 
contributed, either because the scale of the project requires a minimum investment, or 
because of its non-scalability. Examples include the construction of a dam, national defense 
investments, biodiversity conservation, freshwater eutrophication prevention and efforts to 
mitigate dangerous CO2 concentration levels. Since often delegates make these decisions, 
we look at the interplay between delegation and threshold public goods provision. 
Delegation could potentially play a big role here because, unlike linear public goods games 
where the dominant strategy is to defect, threshold public goods games have a second 
equilibrium entailing provision, and thus require coordination among decision makers. One 
may thus expect delegates, insofar as they have information about the preferences of their 
voters, to be better positioned for coordinating on the preferable equilibrium when 
negotiating with other delegates than a group where individuals represent themselves. We 
aim to test such conjecture. Specifically, does this institution induce higher provision, 
relative to self-representation, or are delegates more prone to pursuing self-interest at the 
 3 
expense of the group?1 And what role does the constituency play in steering delegates’ 
choices? 
We analyze the provision of a threshold public good, which only has value if 
enough has been contributed collectively, either because the scale of the project requires a 
minimum investment or owing to its non-scalability. To mimic the challenges to 
cooperation faced by parties deciding on effort coordination in the presence of uncertainty, 
all treatments feature both uncertainty on the location of the threshold and on the 
consequences of non-provision. We test the impact of delegation and peer pressure in the 
form of payoff-immaterial messages to the delegate by comparing provision levels to a 
baseline treatment in which subjects self-represent and directly decide on the contribution 
to the public good. The novelty is the hierarchical structure of the provision choice, as we 
investigate whether elected delegates deciding on behalf of their constituency are better 
placed than self-representing individuals (the standard cohort in the literature) in 
coordinating contributions.  
In line with theoretical expectation and with the literature reviewed below, we find 
that the greater the probability of losses from underprovision, the larger the contributions 
to the public good, while uncertainty about the location of the threshold induces lower 
contributions than certainty. Contrary to the prediction of rational choice theory that our 
delegation treatments should not affect contributions (and in the absence of prior 
experiments investigating delegation in this setting) our main result is that when delegation 
is coupled with public pressure, it has a significantly negative effect on contributions. The 
reason is that delegates tend to adhere to the lowest contribution suggested by the 
constituency, while disregarding the more cooperative suggestion. 
To fix ideas, consider the following two examples of real-world situations 
characterized by such hierarchical decision-making and avoidance of losses from 
underprovision. Several nearby condominiums, each comprised of adjacent privately 
owned houses (or nearby apartment complexes each comprised of multiple flats), need to 
decide on a joint protection investment to counter rising wildfires in the area. Such 
                                                     
1 Throughout this paper, we refer to a “group” as a society that consists of “teams.” Under delegation, each 
team elects a “delegate”, who acts on behalf of the team and shares the earnings equally with her team 
members. 
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investment would finance an early warning system or exterior sprinkle system with the aim 
to deter wildfire damage. To this end, each condominium elects an administrator, who is 
delegated the decision of how much to invest (on behalf of each household) in joint 
protection. If the total investments committed by the administrators is below a target sum 
(the cost of the early warning or exterior sprinkle systems), the project is not provided and 
all households face a high probability of large losses due to wildfire. If, on the other hand, 
the target is reached, the loss is avoided with certainty. A more international example 
concerns EU-wide investments in defense (e.g. a common army or technology): such 
decision arguably requires delegation and implementation is conditional on reaching an 
investment threshold; if investments are insufficient, severe losses may be incurred. In such 
situations there may be considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of investment 
required to avoid losses, a feature we capture in the lab by manipulating the degree of 
uncertainty about the threshold. 
In this section we couch our contribution in the context of some recent literature 
pertaining to the role of delegation and (potentially uncertain) contribution thresholds in 
influencing cooperation (as measured by private provision of public goods). We relegate a 
longer discussion of related literature to Online Appendix, Section 4. 
Much research has studied what facilitates cooperation in experimental settings, 
notably utilizing public goods games to capture the conflicting strategic motives behind 
self- and group-interest. The bulk of the experimental literature on public good provision 
has focused on the linear case, where choices are dominant strategies and the only 
equilibrium entails zero contributions to the public good. The first strand of experimental 
literature that we contribute to studies instead the provision of threshold public goods 
games, where, as in linear games, each group member decides what fraction of the 
endowment to contribute to a public good. The difference is that only if the group 
contribution exceeds a threshold, the public good is provided and each player receives a 
fixed payment, independent of individual contributions. Otherwise, contributions are 
typically wasted (unless refunded; Croson and Marks, 2000 review a large body of such 
experiments). Even in the presence of a known threshold, coordination can be difficult, 
especially when the parties have different stakes in the game (Tavoni et al., 2011). 
Threshold uncertainty also undermines cooperation: subjects dealing with an uncertain 
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common loss arising from crossing a threshold whose location is uncertain find it more 
difficult to sustain cooperation, compared to those who face a certain provision threshold. 
Uncertainty on the location of the tipping point thus aggravates the coordination task, 
increasing the tendency to slip into inaction (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Dannenberg 
et al., 2015), while increased probability of loss if the threshold is missed unsurprisingly 
facilitates coordination by inducing higher contributions to the public good (Milinski et al., 
2008). We revisit this literature by manipulating both the probability of the loss associated 
with underprovision, and uncertainty on the location of the threshold. 
Arguably, decisions on the provision of threshold public goods, whether they entail 
investing in security, building a dam or submitting a national mitigation plan as part of an 
international effort to avoid dangerous climate change, are typically delegated to local or 
national representatives. Yet, the few existing experiments that study the effect of electoral 
delegation on the provision of public goods are not concerned with coordination (but rather 
with cooperation). Hamman, Weber, and Woon (2011) analyze the effect of delegation in 
a linear public goods game, where nine players in a group choose a single allocator who 
decides the amount of contributions for all players. They find that most groups elect high 
contributors who choose maximum contributions on behalf of all group members including 
themselves. In a recent study, Kocher, Tan and Yu  (2018) also use a linear public goods 
game with nine players where delegates decide contributions on behalf of their 
constituency. The main difference here is that the delegates’ decision powers are confined 
to the local level (i.e. 3-players teams), such that the three elected delegates simultaneously 
determine contributions to the “global public good”. They find that subjects tend to vote 
for delegates who assign equal contributions for every team member, although 
heterogeneity in contributions across teams reduces aggregate contributions (and 
efficiency) over time. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to investigate how 
delegation affects public good provision choices that are not (always) dominant strategies2. 
We expect delegation to play a bigger role in such a coordination game, where a second 
                                                     
2 In linear public goods games the dominant strategy is not investing in the public good at all, while the 
threshold public goods game we use, due to the non-linearity introduced by the threshold, entails different 
strategies depending on what one assumes about the other delegates’ contributions. If the threshold is 
perceived to be out of reach, we are back in the above case; if instead the threshold is within reach, provision 
choices can either be strategic substitutes (if the decision-maker does not consider herself pivotal for reaching 
the target investment) or complements otherwise. 
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equilibrium entailing public good provision exists and players can free-ride on others’ 
provision, compared to the linear case. The reason is intuitive: delegates may be better 
positioned to coordinate on the preferable equilibrium than self-representing individuals, 
insofar as information about their constituencies’ preferences is valuable. Our experiment 
is designed to test this intuition.3  
To this end, our experimental treatments are designed to assess how the type of 
constituency that delegates are responsible to, and the degree of public pressure they are 
exposed to, affects the provision of a threshold public good. We tackle these issues in the 
laboratory, where we randomly assign twelve subjects (the society) into four teams of three 
players, and ask each team to elect a delegate through the mechanism of majority voting.  
In both treatments the four locally elected delegates move to a global negotiation 
room where they independently and simultaneously submit the contribution to the public 
good on behalf of their team. However, while in treatment “DnoM” (Delegation without 
messages) they only interact with fellow delegates, in “DM” (Delegation and messages) 
delegates make decisions under the scrutiny of their constituency, i.e. they are joined in the 
negotiation room by their two team members, each of whom signals his preferred 
contribution level with a non-binding text message. While the design abstracts away from 
real-world complexities inherent in the delegated provision of public goods, it captures the 
frequently observed hierarchical structure of decision-making. See Figure 1 for schematic 
representation of our delegation treatments. 
<< Figure 1 Here >> 
In addition to the use of a threshold public goods game instead of a linear one, three 
design features set the present experiment apart from the most closely related literature 
(e.g. Hamman, Weber, and Woon, 2011; Kocher, Tan and Yu, 2018). First, the focus of 
our main treatments is what one might call “minimalist delegation”, absent any concern for 
re-election on the part of delegates. Second, we don’t aim to assess exploitative behavior 
                                                     
3 A second reason for the importance of delegation in our threshold public goods experiment is that, as argued 
in footnote 2, and unlike in the linear setups employed by Hamman, Weber, and Woon, 2011 as well as 
Kocher, Tan and Yu, 2018, provision choices can be strategic substitutes. This implies that the constituency 
may have an incentive to strategically delegate to agents who have a lower valuation for the public good than 
they have themselves, in order to free-ride on the others’ provision (Habla and Winkler, 2016). While testing 
for strategic delegation is not the goal here, it is interesting to see whether we observe such pattern in the 
election of delegates. 
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by delegates within their teams (which could arise if they were free to impose a higher 
burden on their own constituency), but focus instead on the effect of the delegation 
institution in coordinating contributions between teams. As a corollary to our interest in 
inter-team coordination mediated by delegation, our matching groups entail a larger 
number of teams (four) than in the literature, to better capture the challenge of avoiding 
mis-coordination. We thus abstract from electoral concerns and minimize other strategic 
motives within teams, as follows. The elected delegates’ tenure lasts for the entire 
experiment (without further votes), such that they play several variants of a one-shot public 
goods game in which losses can ensue if the sum of their contributions falls short of a 
threshold. Earnings are split evenly among the team members. Consequently, the main 
outcome variable we aim to capture is the group-wide contribution level (relative to the 
provision threshold), resulting from different local institutions at the team level (self-
representation vs delegation) and different degrees of pressure on delegates.4  
Beginning with Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), a related literature 
developed that focus on the salience of group membership in driving individual behavior 
in coordination and cooperation games. Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) focus on 
the performance of groups relative to individuals in playing two games (battle of the sexes 
and prisoner’s dilemma), by assessing the effect of group membership, which is conveyed 
in the lab by letting a player’s own group watch as a “passive audience as decisions are 
made” by a randomly selected group member. They find that this way of making group 
membership salient increases the aggressiveness of the decision-makers under scrutiny. 
While our setup is widely different, we also find that scrutiny by team members, who 
observe the delegate and each send her a message signaling their preferred contribution, 
tend to push the delegate away from cooperation. Specifically, we find that when 
delegation is coupled with public pressure, it has a significantly negative effect on 
contributions, despite the fact that by design the delegates are free to choose their preferred 
public good contribution, and could in principle disregard their constituency. The reason 
                                                     
4 Note that the threshold public goods game in our experiment encompasses both rounds of play where 
coordination on threshold provision is individually optimal, as well as rounds in which the typical cooperation 
dilemma arises (i.e. one is better off not contributing). However, our design is not necessarily representative 
of other types of strategic interactions, such as those occurring when individuals access common property 
resources characterized by rivalry in extraction. See Stoop, Noussair and Van Soest (2012) for a comparison 
of recreational fishermen’s behaviour in the lab and in the field. 
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is that delegates appear to give more weight to the least cooperative message: they focus 
on the lower of the two public good contributions suggested by their teammates.5 
In Section II, we briefly present the model underlying the game tested here. 
Sections III–V are respectively concerned with design, experimental results and discussion, 
followed by a brief conclusion in Section VI. Main supporting tables and figures, additional 
discussion on social motives, theoretical results, laboratory materials, literature discussion, 
as well as additional tables and figures concerning the empirical analysis appear in Online 
Appendix (at tiny.cc/xkgl8y). 
II. Threshold Public Goods Game 
There are 𝑁 teams and each has 𝑘 members. Each member has initial endowment 𝑒 and, thus, each team collectively has an endowment of 𝐸 =  𝑘𝑒. Each team 𝑖 decides 
simultaneously how much to contribute as a team, 𝐶𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝐸], to reach a threshold T, and 
no team can reach the threshold on its own: E < T. If the sum of all teams’ contributions 
exceeds the threshold, ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑇, then they avoid the potential loss, and each team 𝑖 enjoys 
the remaining amount, 𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖. Otherwise, each team is left with a share of 𝑞 ∈  [0, 1) of 
the remaining amount with probability 𝑝 (so that with probability 1 − 𝑝 it still enjoys the 
entirety of 𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖). There is no rebate: players do not receive their contributions back. The 
payoff function with certain threshold is written as follows:  
 𝑔𝑖 = { 𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑝𝑞(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖)  +  (1 − 𝑝)(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇  (1) 
There are two symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria, namely no contribution (NC) and 
a symmetric provision contribution (SPC) (i.e., each team contributes 𝑇/𝑁). The second 
equilibrium exists only if the payoff in SPC exceeds the expected payoff in NC: 
  𝐸 − 𝑇𝑁 ≥ 𝑝𝑞𝐸 + (1 − 𝑝) 𝐸 ⟺ 𝑝𝐸(1 − 𝑞) ≥ 𝑇𝑁   (2) 
Thus, given 𝐸, 𝑇 , and 𝑁 , SPC exists for sufficiently high probability of loss 𝑝  and/or 
damage rate (1 − 𝑞). 
                                                     
5 Put differently, delegation has the potential to bring groups closer to the non-cooperative equilibrium 
(where the threshold public good is not provided), due the negative effect of messages on delegate 
contributions, since the latter are largely driven by the lowest value suggested by the constituency. 
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In this section, we restrict attention to the comparison of these two symmetric pure 
strategy equilibria, since they are likely to be focal relative to the many asymmetric 
equilibria in this game (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999, Dannenberg et al., 2015). Thus, teams’ 
choices are expected to coalesce around those points.  
We experimentally study this threshold public goods game both in the presence of 
a certain threshold T, and when the threshold is a random variable 𝑈𝑇. Under uncertainty 
about the location of the threshold, one of two equally likely thresholds T1 and T2 is selected 
randomly, with mean equal to T (i.e., 𝐸(𝑈𝑇) = 0.5𝑇1 + 0.5𝑇2 = 𝑇, with 𝑇1 < 𝑇2). The 
payoff function with uncertain threshold is written as follows: 
𝑔𝑖𝑢 = { 𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑇20.5(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖) + 0.5(𝑝𝑞(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖)), 𝑖𝑓 𝑇1 ≤ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇2𝑝𝑞(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖)  +  (1 − 𝑝)(𝐸 − 𝐶𝑖), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇1  
           (3) 
There are three symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria with threshold uncertainty: 
no contribution (NC, as for the certain threshold), and symmetric provisions aiming to 
reach either 𝑇1 (SPC1) or 𝑇2 (SPC2). In the latter two, each team contributes 𝑇1 𝑁⁄  and 𝑇2 𝑁⁄ , respectively. The expected payoffs of SPC1 and SPC2 are, respectively: 
 12 𝑝𝑞 (𝐸 − 𝑇1𝑁 ) + 12 (𝐸 − 𝑇1𝑁 ) and 𝐸 − 𝑇2𝑁    (4) 
Hypothesis 1:  Total contributions to the public good increase in p. 
We expect overall team contributions to increase in 𝑝, since team 𝑖’s expected 
payoff under NC decreases (1 and 3), meaning that it would take a much bigger gamble by 
not contributing under both certain and uncertain threshold cases. An increase in p also 
increases attractiveness of SPC2 in comparison to SPC1.  
No contribution is the unique equilibrium in a standard public goods game because 
of free-riding incentives. By introducing the certain threshold, the game is transformed into 
one involving a choice between NC and SPC, and decision makers face the well-known 
problem of coordination owing to strategic uncertainty.  
Let 𝜋𝑖  be the subjective beliefs of team 𝑖  about reaching the threshold when 
targeting the SPC (contributing 𝑇/𝑁 ), given the uncertainty about whether total 
contributions, including those by other teams, will suffice to reach the certain threshold. 
Assuming symmetry, team 𝑖 believes that if it contributes less than 𝑇/𝑁, the other teams’ 
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contributions will not suffice to reach the certain threshold. Condition (2) can be modified 
to accommodate subjective beliefs, as follows: 𝑢(𝑇/𝑁|𝜋𝑖) ≥ 𝑢(0|𝜋𝑖) ⟺ 𝜋𝑖 (𝐸 − 𝑇𝑁) + (1 − 𝜋𝑖) (𝑝𝑞 (𝐸 − 𝑇𝑁) + (1 − 𝑝) (𝐸 − 𝑇𝑁)) ≥ 𝑝𝑞𝐸 + (1 − 𝑝) 𝐸 (5) ⟺ 𝜋𝑖 ≥ 𝑇(1 − 𝑝(1 − 𝑞))(𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇)𝑝(1 − 𝑞)  
where 𝑢(𝐶𝑖|𝜋𝑖) is team 𝑖’s (expected) utility given its subjective beliefs about reaching the 
threshold when contributed 𝑇/𝑁. The threshold will be met provided that the average 
contribution of others is at least T/N (thus, ∑ CjNj≠i ≥ T(N−1)N . ) However, team 𝑖  places 
probability (1 − 𝜋𝑖) on the event that the average contribution of others is lower than 𝑇/𝑁 
(thus, ∑ 𝐶𝑗𝑁𝑗≠𝑖 < 𝑇(𝑁−1)𝑁 .) Thus, introducing subjective probability impedes coordination, as 
teams are less willing to aim for the symmetric provision equilibrium with subjective 
probability in equation (5) than without it in equation (2). 
Note that uncertainty is involved in both symmetric equilibria (NC and SPC) when 𝜋𝑖 is included. While the expected payoff under no contribution depends only on 𝑝, the 
expected payoff under the symmetric provision equilibrium depends on both p and 𝜋𝑖. Thus, 
in choosing between the two strategies, teams may opt for the “safer” zero contribution 
strategy.6  
Hypothesis 2: Total team contributions are lower under threshold uncertainty than 
under certainty about the location of the threshold 
Two possible reasons for the total team contributions to decrease under threshold 
uncertainty are i) general tendency for the decision-makers to have risk-averse preferences, 
captured by some concave utility functions and ii) the possibility of coordination failure. 
While the first is a commonly known, let us expand the discussion on the second more 
below.  
Let 𝜋𝑖1 and 𝜋𝑖2 be the subjective beliefs of team 𝑖 about reaching the threshold when 
targeting SPC1 and SPC2 (contributing 𝑇1 𝑁⁄  and 𝑇2 𝑁⁄ , respectively). These beliefs are 
                                                     
6 This game resembles the stag-hunt game in which players have to decide between socially cooperative and 
safe strategies. By contributing positive amounts, a team runs the risk of becoming the “sucker” of the group, 
which lowers the attractiveness of the SPC. 
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affected by uncertainty about whether total contributions (including those by other teams) 
will suffice to reach the low and high thresholds, respectively. Assuming symmetry, team 𝑖 believes that if it contributes less than 𝑇1 𝑁⁄  or 𝑇2 𝑁⁄ , the other teams’ contributions will 
not suffice to reach the low or high thresholds, respectively. Consequently, mis-
coordination in reaching either threshold is more likely than with a certain threshold, since 
contributions can be wasted in two different ways. First, each team contributes 𝑇1 𝑁⁄  and 
succeed to reach SPC1. Yet, the threshold can still be 𝑇2 with probability 0.5. Second, each 
team contributes 𝑇2 𝑁⁄  and succeed to reach SPC2. Yet, the threshold can still be 𝑇1 with 
probability 0.5. These possibilities of wasting contributions lower the expected payoffs of 
SPC1 and SPC2 given the subjective beliefs 𝜋𝑖1 and 𝜋𝑖2, which makes NC more appealing 
in comparison to the certain threshold. Therefore, threshold uncertainty is expected to 
lower contributions. 
However, notice that under risk-neutrality and for some fixed parameter values, 
especially for very high subjective probabilities 𝜋𝑖2 (i.e., each team 𝑖 has almost no concern 
about not reaching 𝑇2, once it contributes 𝑇2 𝑁⁄ ), payoff under SPC2 can be higher than 
SPC1 and NC. Since contributions under SPC2 are higher than SPC (i.e., 𝑇2 𝑁⁄ > 𝑇 𝑁⁄ ), 
threshold uncertainty may increase the total team contributions.  
III. Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted with undergraduate students using a pen and paper 
protocol at Sogang University, Korea, in February 2013.7 The experiment consists of three 
treatments, with eight independent groups in each treatment, and four teams in each group. 
In every session, we randomly form 𝑁 =  4 teams of variable size 𝑘 (either one or three 
team members), which remain unchanged throughout the session. Each team is endowed 
with 𝐸 =  120  laboratory dollars for every round. 8  Subjects interact anonymously 
throughout the experiment by indicating their choices on sheets of paper that are distributed 
                                                     
7 Sogang University did not yet have an experimental laboratory at the time we ran our experiment, so we 
devised a simple paper and pencil protocol which worked seamlessly, and whose implementation was 
facilitated by RAs and a text messaging application that ensured that the treatments took place in a controlled 
environment. Furthermore, group identity was important for treatments 2 and especially 3, as explained below, 
and our design is arguably more effective for this purpose than a standard computer lab. 
8 To keep the earnings and, thus, the monetary incentives unchanged between treatments, we set the exchange 
rate between the laboratory dollar and the USD in the first treatment at 3 laboratory dollars = 1 USD. In the 
other treatments, the exchange rate is 1 laboratory dollar = 1 USD. Thus, in all treatment decision makers 
(self-representing individuals or delegates) allocate 120 laboratory dollars. 
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and collected by the experimenters. The collected information is shared with the subjects, 
when necessary, by means of projectors. In the beginning of the session, subjects are 
warned that they are not allowed to communicate with others throughout the experiment, 
with the exception of the structured written communication introduced in Treatment 3 (see 
below). Subjects were always supervised by at least one lab assistant and no attempt of 
breach of conduct was detected.  
A. Game phases 
Each session consists of two phases, namely the practice phase (one round) and the 
actual game phase, which consists of six one-shot rounds that feature different values of 𝑝 
and threshold uncertainty. Subjects are informed about the two phases and about the fact 
that one randomly selected round from the actual game phase will determine their earnings 
at the end of the session. However, subjects did not know the exact number of rounds and 
the parameters values shown in Table 1 until they played a given round. In each round, the 
decision makers play a one-shot threshold public goods game. Here, the four teams decide 
simultaneously on how much to contribute to the public good (in multiples of 1 laboratory 
dollar) to reach a group threshold 𝑇 =  240  laboratory dollars (or the corresponding 
uncertain and equally likely thresholds, 𝑇1  =  190 or 𝑇2  =  290).  Subjects are made 
aware that failing to collectively reach the threshold means losing 90% of their remaining 
endowment (i.e., 𝑞 = 0.1 ) with probability 𝑝 . The degree of loss uncertainty is 
parameterized with three values of 𝑝 ∈ {0.55, 0.75, 0.95} , hence, ranging from highly 
uncertain (55% probability) to almost certain (95% probability) losses under non-
provision. Thus, subjects face a potential catastrophic outcome based on 𝑞 = 0.1 and 𝑝 
values. While we want a low value for 𝑞, we particularly chose a non-zero value to avoid 
potential discontinuous behavior around 𝑞 = 0. Then, for 𝑞 = 0.1 we chose the lowest 
value of probability 𝑝 so that expected payoffs are the same for NC and SPC. 
<< Table 1 Here >> 
In each of the first three rounds, they play the game with certain threshold 𝑇 and 
probabilities 𝑝 equal to 0.55, 0.75, and 0.95. In addition to the varying degree of loss 
uncertainty captured by the three values of 𝑝, the following three rounds are characterized 
by uncertainty over the location of the threshold 𝑈𝑇 . Here, 𝑇1  and 𝑇2  have equal 
probability of materializing, and the mean of the two thresholds is 240, as in the first three 
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rounds featuring threshold certainty. Note that the game phase (i.e., the financially 
incentivized phase) is designed such that over the course of the six rounds, the teams face 
each value of 𝑝 twice, once for certainty and once for uncertainty over the location of the 
threshold. We chose the game played in practice round so that subjects experience the most 
complicated version before playing the incentivized rounds.9 Also, we chose the order of 
threshold (un)certainty in the game phase so that the subjects deals with similar problems 
in a row. The order of probabilities played in 6 rounds are determined randomly before the 
experiment, without replacement, and with the same order of rounds played in every 
session.10  
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters used in the experiment and the 
accompanying symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium attaining the highest expected 
payoff. Note that in all rounds, NC is always an equilibrium, but depending on the two 
types of uncertainty, provision can also be an equilibrium. Round 5 is designed to trigger 
the least contributions to the public good, as the only equilibrium is the no contribution 
case. Round 2 is next, as risk neutral players will be indifferent between NC and SPC. In 
the remaining rounds, public good provision is the Pareto-superior equilibrium. The 
difference between Rounds 1 and 3 and Rounds 4 and 6 is that, in the latter two, which 
feature threshold location uncertainty, the highest payoff is attained when the highest and 
lowest targets are met in Round 4 and 6, respectively. Notice that as 𝑝 increases, the highest 
expected payoff equilibrium becomes the one with higher contribution as predicted in 
hypothesis 1. Also, by introducing threshold uncertainty, the highest expected payoff 
equilibrium becomes the one with lower contribution, comparing round 2 with round 5 and 
round 1 with round 6 as predicted in hypothesis 2. Threshold uncertainty seems to increase 
contributions (from SPC to SPC2) when we compare round 3 with round 4. However, in 
Table 1, the highest expected payoff equilibrium does not take concerns for coordination 
                                                     
9 We asked several control questions before the practice phase took place, to make sure that all subjects 
understood the game. We did not start the experiment until every subject had answered correctly all questions. 
The instructions, control questions, decision sheets, and survey questions can be found at 
https://goo.gl/tgSIHr. 
10 We are going to control the order of play in empirical analysis. Similarly, we are going to discuss the 
impact of the specific game played in practice phase on decision makers as it might produce more non-
cooperative behaviour in Section IV.  
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failures (subjective probabilities assumed to be equal to one) and risk preferences into 
account, which would both decrease contributions as discussed earlier. 
To facilitate the coordination task, we also introduce a pledge stage in each round 
before subjects decide their contributions. In the pledge stage, they announce how much 
they intend to contribute and how much they expect the other teams to contribute. Then, 
they play the contribution stage, in which they input their actual contributions to the public 
good.  
We announce the other teams’ contributions and results of each round at the end of 
the session to minimize possible income effects owing to performance in a given round. 
We treat each round as independent observation of a one-shot threshold public goods game. 
Since subjects learn others’ pledges in every round, we control round effects and also 
provide results using only the observation from the first round. Moreover, we randomly 
allocate anonymous ID cards to subjects to determine teams and to control reputation 
effects.11  
B. Practice phase and voting 
After teams are formed, subjects are allocated to their team rooms. The session 
begins with the unpaid practice phase in which team members play a game within the team 
with uncertain threshold 𝑈𝑇 and probability 𝑝 =  0.55. Each team member decides how 
much to pledge, as well as how much s/he expects other teams to contribute. This 
information is projected onto a screen, together with the subjects’ IDs. Team members 
observe their teammates’ pledges and expectations from other teams and decide how much 
to contribute, which is also projected onto the screen with the subjects’ IDs. No information 
(pledges, expectations, and contributions) are revealed to other teams to avoid learning. 
The purpose of the practice round is subjects to form an opinion about their teammates’ 
willingness to invest in the public good. It is particularly important for the treatments with 
k = 3, in which each team anonymously elects a delegate after the pledge stage (before the 
contribution stage; see below). In fact, this is the only information about candidates at the 
moment of voting. 
To elect a delegate, every team member is a candidate and can vote for anyone, 
including him or herself. The majority voting eliminates ties and guarantees that a delegate 
                                                     
11 Details about the ID cards and other experimental procedures are in Online Appendix, Section 4. 
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is chosen, except in the case in which all subjects have one vote. In this case, another vote 
takes place to determine the least wanted candidate. Again, majority voting eliminates ties 
and one team member is chosen to not to be a delegate, except in the case of again all 
having one vote. In this case, we randomly eliminate one candidate. Majority voting then 
guarantees a delegate is chosen with two candidates and three votes. Random elimination 
was only needed 3 times out of 64 elections.  
C. Treatments 
Treatment 1: No delegation (NoD): Individual “delegates” represent only themselves, 
play six rounds, and receive all the team’s earnings.12  
Treatment 2: Delegation, no messages (DnoM): The elected delegates of the teams move 
to another room to play all six rounds. The delegates decide how much their team will 
contribute without communicating with their teammates. In each round, the information 
about the pledge stage is also revealed to the non-delegates (i.e., four teams’ IDs and each 
team’s pledge and expectations from others) and they are asked for their opinion on how 
much their delegate should contribute. Note that teammates could recognize their 
delegate’s pledge and their expectations regarding other teams, as they know their team’s 
ID. So, teammates have the same amount of information as their delegates before deciding 
how much their team should contribute. The earnings of the team are split evenly among 
the members. 
Treatment 3: Delegation and messages (DM): In contrast to DnoM, in DM, all elected 
delegates and the non-delegates move to a common room. The delegates are seated in the 
first rows and their teammates just behind them. Teammates do not see their delegate’s 
decision sheet, but the delegate feels the pressure of his or her teammates sitting behind. 
All subjects know who the delegates are, since they sit in the front rows, and the non-
delegates as they sit behind their delegates. Round 1 begins with the pledge stage in which 
delegates represent their teams and the pledges are declared to all (i.e., four teams’ IDs and 
each team’s pledge and expectations from others). Teammates could recognize their 
delegate’s pledge and their expectations regarding other teams, as they know their team’s 
ID. So, teammates have the same amount of information as their delegates before deciding 
                                                     
12 For the summary of treatments, see Online Appendix, Table 1.  
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how much their team should contribute. After the pledge stage, each non-delegate sends 
his opinion about how much the team should contribute to the team’s delegate via the 
experimenters. The delegate checks the teammates’ opinions and freely chooses the team’s 
contribution level. Furthermore, recall that the delegates’ contributions are not revealed 
until the end of the session. The remaining rounds follow the same procedure. Finally, the 
earnings of the team are split evenly among the members.13 Notice that there are two main 
differences between DnoM and DM treatments: teammates presence and team 
communication. Therefore, any difference between these two treatments could be a result 
of any or joint effect of the two features. 
In the experiment, we design the delegate and her teammates to have the same 
objective function and information. Furthermore, as the team’s earnings are also shared 
equally among the members, there is no strategic interaction between them. Incorporating 
these design features to the model discussed above (e.g., with standard linear or concave 
utility functions), the delegate’s behavior would be the same as that of a self-representing 
individual player, irrespective of whether communication within teams is allowed.14 
Hypothesis 3: When delegates do not receive messages from their team members 
they contribute on average the same as self-representing individuals. 
Hypothesis 4: When delegates receive messages from their team members they 
contribute on average the same as self-representing individuals. 
Notice also that the hypotheses 3 and 4 imply that delegates respond to the changes 
in 𝑝 and threshold uncertainty same as the self-representing individuals, irrespective of 
whether communication within teams is allowed. Relatedly, similar experiments with self-
representing individuals find total individual contributions to increase in 𝑝 (Milinski et al., 
2008), and decrease in threshold uncertainty (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Dannenberg 
et al., 2015) in line with our hypotheses 1 and 2. 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Random assignments of subjects 
                                                     
13  The average earnings were 10,195 KRW, with a maximum of 40,000 and a minimum of 1,000. 
Additionally, subjects receive the show-up fee of 10,000 KRW (about 10 USD). 
14 Furthermore, as we explain in Section III, we rule out strategic communication between teams. 
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224 subjects took part in the experiment. 32 subjects in the noD treatment and 96 
(32 delegates and 64 non-delegates) in each of the DnoM and DM treatments.  We collected 
basic background information (e.g., age, gender, and major,) as well as some attitudinal 
variables (e.g., attitudes toward general risk, the lottery, and global warming) and thoughts 
about their choices during the experiment via post-experiment surveys.15 56–62 percent of 
subjects are male, and the average age is 22–23. On average, they are enrolled for about 
five semesters, and approximately 60 percent of the students are economics or business 
majors. We find no significant differences in any background and also attitudinal variables 
across treatments. This suggests that subjects are assigned randomly to observables across 
treatments.  
B. Group contribution 
For the purpose of our study, a key outcome is the total contribution of a group. 
Figure 2 shows the average group contribution (there are eight groups per treatment) by 
treatment, disaster probability, and threshold uncertainty.16 There are three notable results. 
First, as the probability of loss increases (from 55% to 95%), the group contribution tends 
to be larger. This is not surprising, since the incentive to avoid the risk of the loss should 
be larger when the probability of loss is higher. Second, comparing the average group 
contribution between T and UT for each probability and treatment, we find that participants 
tend to contribute less when they face uncertainty about thresholds. Lastly, we find that the 
average group contribution is the largest in the baseline treatment (noD), and smallest in 
the DM. Next, we compare the average group contribution by treatment for each 
probability and threshold uncertainty setting (T or UT). 
<< Figure 2 Here >> 
We conducted Kruskall-Wallis tests to compare the average contributions across 
conditions. Average contributions across all 18 conditions are different and the differences 
are statistically significant at the 1% level according to the Kruskall-Wallis test result. We 
also conducted the test across three treatments (noD, DnoM and DM), by whether the 
                                                     
15 See Online Appendix, Table 2. 
16 Further results, including contributions in each group, pledges and survey findings are contained in Online 
Appendix, Section 6. 
 18 
threshold is certain or uncertain, or by the probability of loss. The differences are all 
statistically significant (p-value is 0.007, 0.043, and less than 0.001, respectively). 
We also confirm the above findings from unconditional mean differences by 
regression analysis. We run the following regression at the group level: 𝐶𝑗𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑀𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑀𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑝75𝑟 + 𝛾2𝑝95𝑟 + 𝛾3𝑈𝑇𝑟 + 𝜖𝑗𝑟,               (6) 
where the dependent variable 𝐶𝑗𝑟 is the total contribution made by group 𝑗 in round 𝑟 =1, … , 6. 𝐷𝑛𝑜𝑀𝑗  (or 𝐷𝑀𝑗) indicates whether the group belongs to treatment DnoM (or DM). 
The omitted treatment is noD. Then, 𝑝75𝑟 (or 𝑝95𝑟) indicates whether the probability of 
loss is 75% (or 95%) in round 𝑟. The omitted probability is 55%. Lastly, 𝑈𝑇𝑟 indicates 
whether the threshold in round 𝑟 is uncertain. 
The results in Table 2 confirm our findings in Figure 1. Column 1 shows the results 
for all group-round observations. First, compared to noD, the group contribution in DnoM 
is lower by about 17 lab $. This gap is not statistically significant. However, the group 
contribution is significantly lower in DM, by about 51 lab $. This pattern by treatment 
holds after we separate the sample by the probability of loss, from Columns 2, 3, and 4, 
although the statistical significance differs. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis 3 
(i.e., delegates and self-representing individuals contribute the same on average when 
delegates do not communicate with their team members), but reject the hypothesis 4 (i.e., 
delegates and self-representing individuals contribute the same on average when delegates 
do communicate with their team members.) 
<< Table 2 Here >> 
One may be concerned that the experimental design induces a learning effect, since 
subjects play multiple rounds in a fixed group, and might be influenced by previous rounds 
or due to dynamic interaction among players in a group. To address this concern, in the last 
column, we present the results using only the first round for each treatment, which is the 
one featuring T75%. The number of observations is reduced to 24 (= 8 groups × 3 
treatments). However, the group contribution remains significantly lower in DM than in 
noD.  
Another concern mentioned in footnote 10 is that the game played in practice phase 
might have an anchoring effect and produces more non-cooperative behavior in both DnoM 
and DM. This possible effect should lead different to average contribution levels between 
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NoD and DnoM. However, we find no significant difference. At the same time, this effect 
should not affect the behavior between DnoM and DM, since it is present in both 
treatments. Thus, lower delegate contributions with team member communication should 
not be driven by the game played in the practice phase. 
Second, the group contribution is significantly higher, by 62 lab $, when the loss 
probability is 75%, and even higher, by 101 lab $, when it is 95%. Thus, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis 1 (i.e., Total contributions to the public good increase in p.) Lastly, when 
the threshold is uncertain, the total group contribution is lower. This result is in line with 
our theoretical finding that threshold uncertainty should deepen the coordination failure. 
The effect of threshold uncertainty increases with the probability of loss. Thus, we cannot 
reject hypothesis 2 (i.e., total team contributions are lower under threshold uncertainty than 
under certainty about the location of the threshold.) 
C. Team decisions 
We find that the total group contribution is lower when decisions are made by 
delegates (in DnoM and DM), and particularly when delegates are informed of their team 
members’ opinions (in DM). To explain this finding, we examine the individual team 
decisions, as well as how the experimental and contextual variables affect decision makers 
in the different treatments. Specifically, we estimate the following equation, which 
determines the individual team choices: 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑟 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑙𝑑𝑔−𝑖𝑗𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝−𝑖𝑗𝑟 + 𝛾1𝑝75𝑟 + 𝛾2𝑝95𝑟 + 𝛾2𝑈𝑇𝑟 + 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝛿 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜖𝑗𝑟, 
(7) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑟, is the contribution of team 𝑖 in group 𝑗 in round 𝑟, and 𝑃𝑙𝑑𝑔−𝑖𝑗𝑟 and 𝐸𝑥𝑝−𝑖𝑗𝑟 represent the average pledge and the expectation presented by the 
other teams in the same group, respectively. Then, 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑟 encapsulates the messages from 
the team’s non-delegates, and, as a value, either takes the average of the two messages, or 
takes the higher or lower of the two messages.17 Lastly, we include individual-team fixed 
effects 𝛼𝑖𝑗 and round-specific fixed effects 𝜏𝑟.18 The individual-team fixed effects control 
                                                     
17 Note that 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑟  cannot be included for noD since there is no delegation in this treatment. Non-delegates’ 
opinions are not delivered to delegates in DnoM. Therefore, there should be no effect of non-delegates’ 
opinions on delegates’ decisions in DnoM. This will serve as a validity test of our experimental design. 
18 For round-specific fixed effects, although there are six rounds, we can only include three dummies owing 
to perfect linear collinearity with 𝑝75𝑟 , 𝑝95𝑟 , and 𝑈𝑇𝑟 . 
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for any effects from each team’s time-invariant characteristics, including delegates’ 
demographic characteristics or specific traits, as delegates are fixed once they are 
determined by voting. In addition, the round-specific fixed effects control for any potential 
dynamic effects over rounds. Therefore, δ is identified off the variation in teammates’ 
messages round by round.  
<< Table 3 Here >> 
Table 3 presents the regression results. First, it is notable that there is no effect from 
average pledges or from the expectations of other decision makers. This appears to suggest 
that, in accordance with the model studied in Section II, but in contrast to field and 
experimental evidence, communication does not facilitate coordination in this game. 
Second, the probability of loss significantly affects teams’ contributions. 
Comparing Columns 1, 2, and 5, we find that the effects have similar magnitudes 
across treatments. Lastly, we find that threshold uncertainty negatively affects the team 
contribution in DM only. In other words, delegates contribute less when the threshold is 
uncertain only if they receive their teammates’ messages. 
Instead of controlling for individual decision maker fixed effects, we control for the 
decision makers’ characteristics and check how the characteristics affect the level of the 
contribution.19 Overall, the results for the experimental control variables are similar to 
those in Table 3. What is interesting is that decision makers’ individual characteristics, 
such as gender, major, and risk aversion, matter in the noD and DnoM treatments, but are 
statistically insignificant in DM. One interpretation is that with non-delegates’ opinions 
available, delegates behave less as individuals and more as anonymous representatives of 
a team.20  
D. The influence of non-delegates’ messages 
In Column 6 of Table 3, we find that delegates tend to follow the average of the 
non-delegates’ messages. Column 7 shows the main finding of this paper, i.e. that the 
negative effect of messages on contributions is largely driven by the lower of the two values 
                                                     
19 The full results are presented in Online Appendix, Table 3. 
20 Furthermore, the results about the age effect are intriguing. In noD, age does not matter, while it has a 
positive effect in DnoM, where older delegates contribute more. However, the effect is opposite in DM; older 
delegates contribute less after controlling for non-delegates’ opinions. While interesting, one should be 
cautious about inferring from these results, given that there is little age variation among the subjects. 
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suggested by the constituency. The higher message does not have any significant impact 
on delegates’ decisions: delegates appear to concentrate on the non-cooperative suggestion, 
ultimately leading DM groups to gravitate towards the NC equilibrium21. We find similar 
results, except that the higher opinion is also significant, but matters less than the lower 
opinion. As expected, in Table 3, it turns out that teammates’ messages do not matter in 
DnoM. This is not surprising in that the messages are not delivered to delegates. On the 
other hand, the result indicates that the significant effects of the messages in DM are not 
driven by unobservable confounders that could affect both delegates and non-delegates, 
even with no communication between them.22  
Furthermore, it is notable that delegates are particularly sensitive to non-delegates’ 
zero contribution messages. We find that in 93 of the 192 choices, at least one non-delegate 
suggested a zero contribution and, in 63 of the 93 choices (68%), delegates actually 
contributed zero. Obviously, we find no effect of non-delegates’ opinions in DnoM. 
However, the effect of the lower message is not solely driven by the zero contribution 
messages. In Column 8 of Table 3, we restrict the sample to the cases where the lower 
message is not zero. We still find that delegates are influenced by the lower message, but 
not significantly by the higher message.  
Lastly, we check the robustness of the finding that delegates are more sensitive to 
the lower contribution message across various subsamples.23 Overall, we find that our main 
findings are robust. We find that delegates are more inclined to the lower message when 
they do not know anyone in the session or in their team (all strangers). The asymmetric 
effect is also evident, regardless of whether they understand the game rules well and 
                                                     
21 Note that this result is robust to the exclusion of rounds 2 and 5, where the payoff from SPC is not strictly 
greater than the payoff from NC, and hence it is rational to follow the lower message (see Table 1). That is, 
the results of Table 3 hold after excluding rounds 2 and 5: average message and lower/higher messages do 
not matter in DnoM in columns (3) and (4), but they are significant in DM in columns (6) and (7). Note also 
that the model in column (8) restricts the sample to round 1 only, and confirms the result in the “cleanest” 
setting (devoid of this and other confounders such as contamination across rounds). 
22 We examine both delegates’ contributions and non-delegates’ messages for all 192 choices (32 delegates 
× 6 treatments) in DM. Of all 192 choices, 55% are closer to the lower opinion, while only 21% are closer 
to the higher opinion. See Online Appendix, Figure 1. 
23 For the full results, see Online Appendix, Table 4. More specifically, we used the specification of column 
(7) in Table 3 for various subsamples. For example, there are 192 observations in DM, and 126 are male 
delegates and 66 are female delegates. For other subsamples, we use information collected by post-
experiment surveys (the first four subsamples), by experimental design (single certain threshold or double 
uncertain thresholds), or by information on pledges and expectations (the last four subsamples). 
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regardless of gender. The asymmetric effect is not affected by the average pledge or the 
expectation presented by the other delegates. An interesting finding is that the sensitivity 
to the lower suggestion is not statistically significant when the threshold is uncertain, 
although the effect of the lower suggestion is much larger than that of the higher one.  
<< Table 4 Here >> 
Table 4 summarizes the non-delegates’ opinions in DnoM and DM by round. The 
results for DnoM are quite surprising. Although the non-delegates’ contribution decision 
is payoff-irrelevant, we find little difference between non-delegates and delegates. Non-
delegates appear to be willing to contribute more, but that is not always the case.24  
V. Discussion 
Our finding that delegates contribute less than self-representing individuals, 
especially when non-delegates’ messages are close to zero, is puzzling from the perspective 
of the model studied in Section II, given that in our setting the delegates and their 
teammates have the same objective function and there should be no strategic interaction 
between them. In this section we discuss some possible explanations for our findings about 
the behavior of delegates. Among others, we focus on two explanations; a) responsibility 
towards teammates, and b) social regret. Additionally, we investigate the potential role of 
strategic selection of delegates in Online Appendix Section 2, which we conclude that it is 
unlikely that selection into delegates itself, or strategic delegation, explains our findings.   
Differently from the case of self-representation, a delegate may feel responsible 
towards her teammates, since her decision affects not only her own payoff but also theirs. 
We speculate about three reasons why such responsibility could push delegates to 
contribute less than self-representing individuals. First, delegates may fear to let teammates 
down and this could induce them to become more cautious, i.e. minimize the risk of being 
the sucker by gravitating towards NC. Such fear of being blamed for wasting positive 
contributions could deter investments in the public good even in the absence of 
communication. Second, in the treatment featuring messages, delegates may feel the need 
                                                     
24 Recall that, unlike in DnoM, non-delegates in DM can signal their preferred contributions to their delegates. 
However the results in Table 5 show that non-delegates in DM did not behave differently from those in DnoM. 
Indeed, the last column shows that we cannot reject the null that non-delegates in DM are the same as those 
in DnoM. This means that the lower public good contributions by the delegates in DM are attributable to the 
fact that they responded to the messages sent by their constituency.  
 23 
to conform to the suggestions of their constituency, even if the messages are non-binding, 
possibly due to a sense of responsibility for having been voted “into office” (in most cases 
by at least one of the teammates). Combining the two lines of thought above, one would 
expect the delegate to give more weight to the lower of the two messages about preferred 
contributions. Third, if a delegate expects other delegates to contribute little to the public 
good, again due to the above arguments, then she would have an additional incentive not 
to contribute. Bolton et al. (2015), Charness and Jackson (2009), and Song (2008) suggest 
similar implications for responsibility and show that delegates trust and cooperate less in 
trust and stag-hunt games, and choose safer lotteries.  
Although we observe a similar tendency, the gap between group contributions in 
DnoM and NoD was not statistically significant. Messages appear to be determinant in 
triggering significant reductions in contributions. We thus come back to the interesting case 
where the delegate receives asymmetric contribution suggestions, e.g. one high and one 
low message in our setting, and elaborate on its implications. We focus on two reasons why 
delegates may be more likely to follow low contribution suggestions than high ones. First, 
the anticipated pain of regret for making the wrong choice is strengthened if people are 
aware of the foregone choice (Zeelenberg, 1999). Thus, the above responsibility effects are 
more salient when the delegates receive the teammates’ messages. Second, a delegate who 
receives a low contribution suggestion could easily anticipate that the other delegates also 
receive and follow such suggestions. Thus, she would also contribute nothing, anticipating 
that the group would fail to reach the threshold regardless of her contribution. In a lottery 
choice setup, Bolton et al. (2015) show that delegates tend to conform to both teammates 
suggesting safe and risky options, but that only the “safe” suggestions have a significant 
effect. Our experimental data aligns with this finding, in the sense that delegates selectively 
listen to the message suggesting low or zero contributions (and avoid the risk of wasting 
contributions, not reaching the target and being the “sucker”). Thus, we argue that some 
combination of these forces drives the delegates to contribute less than self-representing 
individuals.25 
                                                     
25 Note that, due to the experimental design, we cannot attribute the difference between the DM and DnoM 
treatments to messages alone. The reason is that while non-delegates were also present in the decision room 
in DM, they sat in a different room in DnoM. For this reason, we can only conclude that public pressure from 
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In order to understand the delegate’s behavior both in the presence and in the 
absence of the teammates’ messages in the threshold public goods game that we tested 
experimentally here, we sketch the results of an application of a social regret model (İriş, 
2018). The latter theory modifies Loomes and Sugden’s (1982) individual regret-aversion 
model; as detailed in Online Appendix Section 3, we extend İriş (2018) by studying binary 
choice environments with more than two states of nature. Specifically, this model departs 
from standard preferences by allowing the delegate to experience regret (or rejoice) for not 
having followed a teammate’s message if the suggested contribution would have secured 
a higher (lower) payoff. We assume that regret and rejoice are greater for larger utility 
differences (in an increasing fashion) between what a team receives based on the delegate’s 
contribution and what the same team would have received from another action suggested 
by the teammates. When the utility difference increases linearly, the delegate is social 
regret-neutral and acts as if she was maximizing her expected utility. On the other hand, if 
the utility difference increases convexly, the delegate is social regret-averse. 26  Social 
regret-averse delegates value the states with larger utility differences more. In the case of 
a certain threshold, we have three possible states: reaching the threshold and avoiding the 
potential loss (RT), not reaching the threshold and suffering the ensuing loss (NTL), and 
not reaching the threshold, but getting lucky as the loss does not happen (NTNL). Our main 
result shows that if the utility difference is larger in NTL or NTNL than RT, which is 
satisfied by the parameters chosen in the experiment, then social regret-averse delegates 
follow low contribution suggestions more than messages calling for high contributions. 
Thus, social regret-aversion rationalizes the main finding of our experiment. 
VI. Conclusion 
As previously mentioned, there are behavioral and theoretical arguments (beyond 
the realm of rational choice theory) to expect that, relative to the baseline case where 
decision makers act independently, a delegate who receives contrasting signals by the 
constituency will place more weight on the non-cooperative messages. In line with this 
expectation, we find that, while delegation of the investment decision to an appointed 
                                                     
the constituency, in the form of a combination of messages and passive auditing in the decision room, induces 
the delegates to decrease group contributions to the public good. 
26 See Bleichrodt and Wakker (2015) for more about this evidence and applications of regret theory. 
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leader has little effect when decoupled from the peer pressure of non-delegates, it does 
influence delegate behavior in the treatment featuring public pressure from the 
constituency. Here the contribution to the public good drops significantly, even if the 
messages do not alter the delegate’s incentives. The empirical analysis confirms that this 
drop is attributable to the fact that delegates tend to focus on the lowest contribution level 
suggested by non-delegates. Hence, negative examples can be detrimental to cooperation.    
The simple setup utilized here, while arguably more conducive to cooperation than 
the more complex real-world negotiations, provides stark implications for policy. For 
example, consider the parallel between the experimental setting and the emissions 
reduction problem. Reaching an agreement on emission trajectories that are compatible 
with safe levels of global warming requires collaboration between negotiators (acting on 
behalf of their national constituencies) and their foreign counterparts. The stakes are 
indisputably high according to the scientific evidence on the losses associated with 
substantial warming, such that the collectively rational decision would be to coordinate 
efforts to avert abrupt future changes in the climate. In the terminology of our game, this 
is the provision equilibrium, and if all parties do their part, the cost of reducing emissions, 
relative to business as usual, is more than compensated for by the expected future savings 
from avoiding dangerous climate changes.  
However, as in the game, individual free-riding incentives mean that unilateral 
deviations from the provision strategy can quickly destabilize cooperation: once a 
(sufficiently large) country defects, reaching the target may be unfeasible or uneconomical. 
We can think of this as strategic uncertainty about co-players’ actions. The game also 
captures another feature that has the potential to jeopardize climate cooperation, namely 
scientific uncertainty on the location of the threshold. As expected, we find that uncertainty 
reduces the contributions to the public good and, consequently, the probability of 
coordination on the cautious equilibrium. Lastly, the negative effect of signaling by the 
constituency points to the dark side of leading by words: delegates appear to be quick to 
follow suggestions only when these entail pursuing a risky gamble. 
Real-life delegation of contribution decisions pertaining to threshold public goods 
is likely to be more complicated. Here we focused on a simple implementation of the 
complex political economy context that surrounds delegation; further work may contribute 
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to this strand, for instance by disentangling the effect of different forms of public pressure 
on delegates’ contributions. Furthermore, the present setup restricts attention to small 
groups of symmetric subjects in terms of expected payoffs. Asymmetries entail different 
stakes for different parties, and a larger group size amplifies the problem of deterring 
unilateral deviations from the provision strategy. Thus, it appears that, in the face of 
uncertainty, without a strong call for action at the domestic level, delegates may be 
reluctant to commit to sizeable contributions and may selectively listen to those who 
suggest staying with the status quo. 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the type of interactions captured by this 
experiment are relevant for more localized cooperation problems such as shared 
investments in safety, as described in the introduction. Of course, the present design does 
not shed light on other important cooperation problems, such as the more commonly 
studied provision of linear public goods. Another specific design choice is the loss frame 
(decision makers can invest in the public pot in order to avoid a loss): it is likely that a 
similar experiment framed in the gain domain would induce different behavior. 
Furthermore different, non-student, subject populations may also behave differently, and 
even the choice of a different practice phase may have behavioral repercussions, since the 
dominant strategy here is non-cooperation, potentially priming subjects to defection in later 
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Figure 2. Average Group Contributions across Treatments 
 
 
Notes: T55% = Certain threshold with probability of loss 55%; T75% = Certain threshold with probability of loss 75%; 
T95% = Certain threshold with probability of loss 95%; UT55% = Uncertain threshold with probability of loss 55%; 
UT75% = Uncertain threshold with probability of loss 75%; UT95% = Uncertain threshold with probability of loss 


















Table 1: Main Parameters and Equilibria 
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Table 2. Treatment Effects on Group Contribution 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All p = 55% p = 75% p = 95% First round 
            
DnoM -17.146 -32.188 -28.313 9.062 -33.625 
 (18.958) (25.156) (24.151) (21.029) (25.116) 
DM -50.917*** -62.188** -60.375*** -30.188 -49.375* 
 (17.906) (23.646) (21.483) (17.948) (25.463) 
Loss prob. = 75% 62.271***     
 (8.856)     
Loss prob. = 95% 100.979***     
 (10.191)     
Uncertain thresholds -22.417** -9.833 -23.042* -34.375**  
 (8.652) (9.025) (11.806) (13.170)  
Constant 123.062*** 125.542*** 192.521*** 214.375*** 190.625*** 
 (14.041) (18.663) (16.831) (12.450) (16.241) 
            
Observations 144 48 48 48 24 
R-squared 0.471 0.209 0.225 0.193 0.152 
Notes: OLS Estimation. Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are presented in parentheses. Each group played 6 




Table 3. Determinants of Team Contribution: Individual Fixed Effect 
           
Treatment noD   DnoM   DM 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                     
Avg. pledge by others -0.040  0.053 0.053 0.051  0.039 0.061 0.065 0.060 
 (0.102)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)  (0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.137) 
Avg. expectation by others -0.044  0.319 0.319 0.325  -0.186 -0.169 -0.183 0.187 
 (0.213)  (0.235) (0.237) (0.231)  (0.137) (0.166) (0.163) (0.328) 
75% chance of loss 18.739***  15.068** 15.082*** 15.154***  15.084*** 8.177* 8.733* 13.595 
 (5.353)  (5.541) (5.440) (5.487)  (5.336) (4.733) (4.734) (8.665) 
95% chance of loss 24.859***  30.286*** 30.303*** 30.554***  29.065*** 16.877*** 16.889*** 19.470** 
 (5.243)  (6.528) (6.562) (6.623)  (6.266) (5.758) (5.921) (9.073) 
Uncertain thresholds -3.878  -4.512 -4.508 -4.216  -9.601* -12.065** -11.495** -21.257** 
 (5.494)  (5.928) (5.961) (5.954)  (5.333) (4.761) (4.729) (9.235) 
Team members' opinions           
Average    -0.001    0.483***   
    (0.116)    (0.119)   
Lower     0.025    0.342*** 0.411* 
     (0.089)    (0.115) (0.213) 
Higher     -0.032    0.136 -0.334 
     (0.107)    (0.084) (0.298) 
Constant 38.342*  -4.724 -4.705 -3.931  -15.904 -13.386 -12.074 19.275 
 (22.410)  (12.597) (12.692) (13.892)  (18.516) (19.755) (19.091) (32.907) 
                      
Team FE Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Round FE Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 192  192 192 192  192 192 192 99 
R-squared 0.478   0.588 0.588 0.589   0.614 0.672 0.676 0.604 
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors, clustered by team, are presented in parentheses. In column (8), zero team member suggestions are removed 







Table 4. Average Contributions of Delegates and Non-delegates 
 

















T55% 27.94 21.50  6.44  25.47 19.22 6.25  2.47  
 (25.81) (25.17) [0.25]  (26.97) (25.12) [0.28]  [0.74]  
T75% 40.45 39.25 1.20  38.95 35.31 3.64  1.50  
 (25.58) (25.22) [0.83]  (26.28) (26.94) [0.53]  [0.60]  
T95% 42.97 52.94 -9.97  49.30  49.56 -0.26  -6.33  
 (31.67) (20.08) [0.11]  (24.05) (23.62) [0.96]  [0.21]  
UT55% 26.02 22.72 3.30  26.61 10.00  16.61  -0.59  
 (25.69) (28.38) [0.57]  (28.90) (20.32) [0.00]  [1.00]  
UT75% 45.05 37.09 7.96  44.03 25.00  19.03  1.02  
 (30.18) (28.82) [0.22]  (30.08) (28.30) [0.00]  [0.90]  
UT95% 52.97 50.19 2.78  52.95 33.94 19.01  0.02  
  (30.01) (25.12) [0.65]  (27.69) (30.11) [0.00]  [0.85]  
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. P-values of equality tests are presented in the last 
column.  
 
